

κρίνει BOV²; 441 ἦ B²DAV^cL: ἦ BOMVP; 497 τλήμων B^cDMAL: τλήμων BOVP; 522 οἶκων B²DMAVTr et gB^c: οἶκων A: οἶκον BOLP et gB; 561 προθυμία(ι) B³DMAVLP: -ίαν O; 581 ἦ B^cDLP: ἦ BOMAV; 597 ξύν νέοισιν B^cO^cDALP et gE: ξυνέοισιν MV³: ξυνέοισιν BO: ξυνέοισιν V: ξυνέοισιν gV; 606 ἦγαγες B²DMVL^cP: ἦγαγε BOAL; 626 ἔχης B²DL: ἔχεις BOMAVP; 750 θεοί σοι B^cO(D)AVL^cP² (θεοίσι D): θεοῖσι M: θεοῖσι BLP; 762 εἷς B²DMAVLP²: εἶ BOP; 763 πρέσβυς περ ὦν B²DAVLP: πρεσβυτέρων BOM; 770 εἶ τι B³DMAVLP: εἶσι B^{uv}O; 784 ὀνειδέσιν ἔγκειται B²DHAVLP et gB: -σι νείκη τε BOM; 819 εὐπειθέστεροι B²D<H>MAVLP: εὐτυχέστεροι BO; 837 δαΐας MAVLP: δικαίας BO: δὲ βίας fort. uol. B² (δεμίας D); 898 μόνην B²DHAVL^cP: μόνη BOML; 935 βλέπουσ' ἄν B²(D)HV²P (-σ' ἄν D): -ουσαν BOMAVL.

There is one correction in B which I confidently attribute to B⁴ (Lascaris): 5 χρόνῳ om. BOD (add. B⁴). The same hand is possibly responsible for a few other corrections which do not appear in D: 341 καλεῖ BODM<A²>LP: κάλει B^cA^cV (cf. Σ^{mb} et V³ (ἀντι τοῦ) ἐκάλει); 409 εἴ ἦ B^c; 437 εὐρώτα(ι) B^cMAVLP: -ταις BOD; 443 τί om. BOD (add. B^c); 443 σ' οὐ B^cVL: σου BODMP: σου AV³mp; 659 δ' om. BODM et Σ^v (add. B^c; suprascript, possibly the first hand); 750 εὐ om. BOD (add. B^c; suprascript, possibly the first hand).

B is alone in error at: 174 μίγνυται| μείγ- B; 213 δοθῆν| δοθεῖ B; 298 Πριάμου| Πριάμοιο B; 383 θατέρω(ι)| θάτερον B; 439 δ' ἦ B; 561 σε| σοι B; 646 φρονεῖν δοκοῦντας| δοκεῖν φρονούντας B; 661 θέλων| θέλω B; 856 τὰ(ι)δ' OMAVTrP²: τὰδ' LP: τῶδ' B; 887 ξυγγενοῦς| ξυγγενοῦς B; 942 τοῖς ἐμοῖς| τοῖς ἐμοῦς B. There are in addition several places where an error in B has been corrected by a later hand and the original reading is uncertain: e.g. 68 δύστηνος B² (-νε B^c); 272 φάρ*ακ' B (φάρμακ' B³); 340 ἀνέξ****(-εται B³); 411 η̄δε B (ἦδε B³); 927 **χίστοισιν B (αἰσχ- B²).

O is alone in error at: hypoth. line 1 (Murray) λαβῶν| λαχῶν O; line 6 ἐβουλεύετο| -εύσατο O; line 14 δὲ om. O; 90 πάθω κακόν| κακὸν πάθω B, κακὸν πάθη O; 91 οἴσπερ| οἶς O; 93 ἐμπέφυκε| ἐκπ- O; 112 τε om. O; 114 ὑπο-| ἀπο- O; 117 ᾶ| ὦ O; 191 ἐμαυτῆν| ἐλλ' αὐτὴν O; 195 θ' ἦ δ' O; 313 Μενελέω| -λάου O; 324 στρατηγῶν| στρατηλατῶν O; 342 Πηλέως| -λέω O; 381 ἐκφεύγει| -φύει O; 384 μοι| τοι O; 385 λαχοῦσά γ' ἢ λαχοῦσ' O; 399 σφαγὰς| φαγὰς O; 423 ξύμβρασιν| ξύμβρασι O; 453 ὄλοισθ' ἢ ὄλοισθ' O; 588 γε| τε O; om. V (δὲ V³); 593 ἄδουλα| αἰδου O; 636 τοι| σοι O; 654 κοινουμένην| κιν- O: κιν- V^{ac}; 656 ἦδ' ἢ θ' O; 664 om. O; 679 ἦ om. O; 692 ματαίων| μακραίων O; 715 ἄν om. O; 868 σου| σοι O: om. P; 873 οὐ μέσως| ἀμέσως O; 926 Φοίβου| φόβου O; 1220 πρόσω| πρόσω O.

Here are the places where B and O have a different reading and share that reading with other manuscripts:

(i) O shares the right reading, B the wrong reading: hypoth. line 12 ὁ om. BP; 151 σπαρτιάτιδος| σπαρτιάδος BL^{ac}; 163 θέλη(ι)| θέλοι BL^{ac}; 199 αὐτῆ B³OMLP et Σ^v: -τῆ BAV; 240 αὐ OA et Σ^m: ἄν BM^{uv}VLP et Σ^{bv} et gV; 496 κατακεκριμένον

OMA^cVL^cP^c: -ιμμένον B<ALP>V³; 536 ἐξανύ-σωμαι| -ύσομαι BALP; 657 στέγος| τέγος MB; 750 θεοί σοι B^cOAVL^cP²: θεοῖσι M: θεοῖσι BLP; 810 κτείνουσα| -νασα BL; 868 αὐ τὸ OLV^c: αὐτὸ (B)MAVP (αὐτὸ* B); 922 προσωτάτω| -τάτω BM.

(ii) B shares the right reading, O the wrong reading: hypoth. line 2 δὲ om. OVL^{ac}; 53 κτείνει| τείνει OIT^b: τίνει AP et η̄Σ^{mv}; 167 χερὶ BHML: χερὶ O^{uv}A^{uv}V et Σ^v: περι- P; 180 θέλοι| -ει O et Va (-οι O^s et Va^s); 244 τὰ γ' ἢ τὰδ' OP; 382 κτενῶ| κτανῶ OP; 399 τροχλητάτους| -του OM; 679 ὠφελοῖς BO^sAVTrP²: -λεῖς OM<L>P; 810 κτανεῖν BMAV (et O marg.): θανεῖν OHLPV³mp; 1262 πόρου BO^sMAV²LP: πόντου OVV³.

In the parts of the text where B is missing (957–1212, 1236–49, 1272–88) the readings of D are witnesses to the lost readings of B. Such readings are of interest only where they differ from those of O (D is itself missing from 1129–1219). There are only three such differences: 994 φοβηθῆς DAV³PT: -θεῖς OMVL; 1034 ἀγαμεμνόσιος DM et Σ^v: -νειος OAVLP; 1099 δόμοις DAVLP: δρόμοις OM.

There is no place where B alone preserves the truth. There is one place where O alone preserves the truth, and another where it may do so: 832 πέπλους O, sicut conii. Reiske: πέπλοις cett.; 833 πέπλοις| πέπλους O. I have discussed these lines in *Illinois Class. Stud.* vi.1 (1981) 95–8.

Here are three divergences between B and O, where both are in error: 185 τὸ μῆ| καὶ τὸ μῆ B et gV: καὶ τὸ O; 588 σὸν . . . κάρα| σὴν . . . κάραν B: σὴν . . . χέρα O (σὴν etiam V³); 791 σε καὶ HMLVLP: τε καὶ B: καὶ O^s: om. A.

The picture which this evidence presents of the relationship between B and O is precisely the same picture as we found in *Alceste*. The hypothesis of contamination, although it cannot be ruled out, does not have to be invoked as an explanation of any reading where O differs from B. All of the readings which B or O, when they disagree, share with other manuscripts can be readily explained as the products of either (i) independent errors or (ii) the presence of occasional variants in the common ancestor.

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Two notes on τέλος and related words in the *Oresteia*

1. τελεσφόρος at *Cho.* 663–4

For *Sho.*

ἐξελεθῆτω τις δωμαίων τελεσφόρος
γυνὴ τόπαρχος, ἄνδρα δ' εὐπρεπέστερον.

τελεσφόρος in these lines is translated by LSJ as 'one having the management or ordering' and this sense of 'being in command', 'having authority' from the use of τέλος as 'authority', 'magistracy' (LSJ I 3 and 4) is followed by Sidgwick, Tucker, Verrall, Lloyd-Jones and others¹ going back to the scholiast who glosses the

¹ D. Holwerda, *TEΛΟΣ*, *Mnemos.* xvi (1963) 345 ff., and M. Bayfield, 'Some derivatives of τέλος', *CR* xv (1901) 445 ff. adopt the

term ἀρχηγός, διοικητής. τελεσφόρος here, however, picks up in particular two significant earlier uses of the word in this play, at two moments, such as this, of high tension (212, Orestes' first announcement of himself to Electra; 541, Orestes' first statement of his predictive dream-analysis and plan of revenge) and it goes beyond, as I shall argue, the reductive reading of the scholia, lexicæ, commentators, and translators.

For the ambiguity² of this term, the sort of τέλος Clytemnestra may be said to φέρειν, is significant particularly at this specific juncture of the narrative. For the 'woman' who 'is to come out', the ruler of the house, constitutes precisely the aim of Orestes' action, the fulfilment of his desire. She brings (φέρειν) the telos of his action. Furthermore, the murder of Agamemnon has been imaged as a sacrifice by Clytemnestra and Cassandra and the chorus.³ The parodos of the *Agamemnon* talked of θυσίαν ἐτέραν (150), and the reciprocal act of Orestes' revenge may be so considered: τελεσφόρος—bringing (φέρειν) the sacrificial rite, offering (τέλος). So too, however, as has been analysed by Vidal-Naquet, Zeitlin and others,⁴ Orestes has been depicted in the imagery and narrative as undergoing a sort of initiation, a *rite de passage*, like the initiation into the mysteries, or an ephebic rite. The forcible rejection of his mother, his following punishment and incorporation into society can be read within this structure: τελεσφόρος—bringing the initiation (τέλος). Moreover, as the opening lines of the trilogy prayed for release, for an end, so Orestes depicts his plan as a 'final act' (cf. e.g. 578): τελεσφόρος—'bringing consummation', 'fulfilment'. Orestes has prayed to die having killed his mother (438 ἔπειτ' ἐγὼ νοσφίσας <σ> ὀλοίμαν) and indeed the reciprocity of action (expressed

earlier by the phrase φέρει φέροντ', *Ag.* 1562)⁵ suggests he might. τελεσφόρος: bringing 'death'—to one or both.

In this light, τελεσφόρος also recalls the Carpet Scene of *Agamemnon*, where the act of standing on the tapestries is called by Agamemnon at Clytemnestra's prompting a τέλος (934), a 'ritual performance', as Fraenkel translates . . . as Clytemnestra had called her order for its spreading (908 αἷς ἐπέσταλται τέλος).⁶ As the queen enters the palace, it is to Zeus τέλειε she prays, that the god should τέλει her prayers, and, even more ominously, that μέλοι δέ τοί σοι τῶν περ ἄν μέλλης τελεῖν (*Ag.* 974). The ambiguity (often noted) between 'do', 'sacrifice', between 'sacrificial offering', 'death', 'action' is not only part of the spread of her net of words over her ἀνδρὸς τελείου (972, 'pater familias' LSJ; 'a grim word', Verrall, 'applied to the perfect victim') but also part of the movement whereby action is seen as part of a system of divine and mortal relations, a communication.⁷ As the adulterous regicide, then, had gone into the palace with this four-fold, ambiguous repetition of τελ- on her lips, so she is asked by the king's son and avenger to 'come out'⁸ τελεσφόρος.

For she is to repay. Indeed, τέλος also means 'a tax', 'that which is paid'. τέλος, τελεσφόρος, then, are sited also within the imagery of financial exchange, of economics, which has been commented on by many and most recently by Macleod.⁹ He notes also the connection of πράσσεισθαι and πράκτωρ (which 'are normally connected with the exaction of debts and fines', p. 134) with Agamemnon's punishment of Paris, with the process of revenge. So we may add (for example) from the opening of the *kommos* these lines which draw explicitly the connection of reciprocal action (revenge) with paying a debt—and with the verb τελεῖν, *Cho.* 309–11:

ἀντὶ μὲν ἐχθρὰς γλώσσης ἐχθρὰ
γλώσσα τελείσθω τοῦ φιλομένου
πράσσουσα Δίκη μὲν' αὐτεῖ.

τέλος as the penalty of action: the doer suffers. So let the queen come out τελεσφόρος.

We may further recall what Lebeck calls 'the telos of marriage, the telos of death',¹⁰ a system of imagery that she reads in the *Oresteia* linking through the terms τελ- the marriage ceremony and its adulterous corruption to the death to which such transgression leads. The corruption righted will reach in the *Eumenides* (through Apollo's appeal to Ἥρας τελείας καὶ Διὸς πιστώματα, *Eum.* 214) towards the Erinyes' acceptance of πρὸ παιδῶν καὶ γαμηλίου τέλους, *Eum.* 835. τέλος should be the consummation of the marriage ceremony;

⁵ See H. Neitzel, 'ΦΕΡΕΙ ΦΕΡΟΝΤ': ein aischyleisches Orakel', *Hermes* cviii (1979) 133 ff.

⁶ These words are echoed by Athene in the *Eumenides* of the different but related task of the jurors: 743 ὅσοις δικαστῶν τοῦτ' ἐπέσταλται τέλος.

⁷ The interpenetration of the divine and human worlds forms around τέλος as the term of communication, exchange (sacrifice, injunction, vow), as, for example, Cassandra says of herself μάντις μ' Ἀπόλλων τῶδ' ἐπέστησεν τέλει (*Ag.* 1220). This colours the chorus' *gnomē*: τί γὰρ βροτοῖς ἄνευ Διὸς τελεῖται; (*Ag.* 1487). Theology and teleology are ever linked.

⁸ On the importance of the palace door, see O. Taplin, *The Stagecraft of Aeschylus* (Oxford 1977) 342 ff.

⁹ C. W. Macleod, 'Politics and the *Oresteia*', *JHS* cii (1982) 124 ff.

¹⁰ A. Lebeck, *The Oresteia* (Washington 1971) 68 ff.

same reading. U. Fischer in a more useful work, *Der Telosgedanke in den Dramen des Aischylos* (Hildesheim 1965) notes here a limited ambiguity in Orestes' language. He writes (generally) 'es ist ein Charakteristikum der aischyleischen Dramaturgie dass anscheinend eindeutige Sinngehalte an Stellen, wo etwas verdeckt oder aufgedeckt werden soll, plötzlich durch eine neu sich ergebende dramatische Konstellation oder durch Beifügung eines Begriffs, deren Anglieder die Verbindung zu anderen Textstellen nahelegt, in ihrer scheinbar einseitigen Bedeutung verwandelt und ins Doppelsinnige vertieft werden' (15 f.). It will be clear by the end of this piece in what ways my writing goes beyond Fischer's approach.

² LSJ suggest a play of active and passive senses, which are not, however, to be simply separated; as one might think from, say, Jebb's translation of Arist. *Rhet.* iii 3.1., where two uses of τελεσφόρος from Alcidas are translated respectively 'doom-fraught' and 'end-fulfilling'. Such an ambiguity seems irrepressible—and significant—in an expression such as the highly dramatic exclamation of Eteocles at *Sept.* 655, ὦ μοι πατρός δὴ νῦν ἀραὶ τελεσφόροι. For the fulfilment of the curse will bring precisely his doom. In the *Septem*, τέλος (and related words) occur almost as regularly and in as wide a range of senses as in the *Oresteia*. See the indices of Verrall's and Tucker's editions, Fischer (n. 1) 120–1, 124, and O. Hiltbrunner, *Wiederholungs- und Motivtechnik bei Aischylos* (Bern 1950) 10, 26, 35.

³ F. Zeitlin, 'The motif of the corrupted sacrifice in Aeschylus' *Oresteia*', *TAPA* xcvi (1965) 463 ff. has drawn out some of the significance of this.

⁴ P. Vidal-Naquet, 'The Black Hunter and the Origins of the Athenian Ephebeia' *PCPS* xcix (1968) 49 ff; also, with J.-P. Vernant, *Mythe et Tragédie en Grèce ancienne* (Paris 1972) 135 ff.; F. Zeitlin, 'The Dynamics of Misogyny in the *Oresteia*', *Arethusa* xi (1978) 149 ff.; M. Tierney, 'The Mysteries and the *Oresteia*', *JHS* lvii (1937) 11 ff.; G. Thomson, 'Mystical Allusions in the *Oresteia*', *JHS* lv (1935) 20 ff. Cf. also P. Wheelwright, *The Burning Fountain* (Bloomington 1954).

for Helen's avengers and her sister's husband¹¹ it is the consummation of death.

τελεσφόρος, evokes, then, also those series of images of corrupted marriage ties. It is juxtaposed to γυνή significantly not only in the implicit peculiarity of a woman in charge, a woman coming out (and here we could start discussing the much discussed sexual-tensions in the *Oresteia*, and the significance of δωμάτων . . .) but also in the manner in which the word γυνή juxtaposed to τελ- recalls the system of (transgressed) sexual norms that Orestes is to attempt to right, the adultery¹² as well as the lack of the male ruler.

All these senses of τέλος¹³ (and φέρειν) are inscribed in the narrative of the *Oresteia*. On his entrance, Orestes ordered Electra to pray for a successful future with τελεσφόρους εὐχάς; he announced Clytemnestra's dream to be τελεσφόρος—bringing (his) telos; so τελεσφόρος is significantly used at this third moment of the process of revenge. Clytemnestra, the ruler of the house, brings (φέρειν) the telos in all its senses. In this play of terms, how can the network of meanings be reduced to the simple reading offered by the scholiast and others?

But more: Clytemnestra is τελεσφόρος because of the express search in the *Oresteia* for a telos. A veritable teleology. As Clytemnestra sought to make a contract with the *daimon* of the house (*Ag.* 1568 ff.), so Orestes hopes the Erinyes will drink in Clytemnestra's death the third and final drink of blood (as Clytemnestra had struck the third blow, a third libation to the powers of the underworld, *Ag.* 1385 ff.—so our reading returns on itself again).¹⁴ So, after the murder of Clytemnestra, the chorus express their sense of an end, the end they hope Clytemnestra's death has brought (*Cho.* 1065–7):

ὄδε τοι μελάθροις τοῖς βασιλείοις
τρίτος αὖ χειμῶν
πνεύσας γονίας ἐτελέσθη.

But after the expression of the three events they consider to make up the narrative, they proclaim the third saviour only to regress to a desperate alternative, the 'end' doubles into doubt (*Cho.* 1073–4):

νῦν δ' αὖ τρίτος ἦλθέ ποθεν σωτήρ,
ἢ μόρον εἶπω;

Indeed, it is precisely the end, here at the ending of the play, which is put in doubt (*Cho.* 1075–6):

ποῖ δῆτα κρανεῖ, ποῖ καταλήξει
μετακομισθὲν μένος ἄτης;

As Orestes had said (*Cho.* 1021):

οὐ γὰρ οἶδ' ὅπη τελεῖ.

The search for an end as a control, as an organising

¹¹ Lebeck quotes here *Ag.* 1455 ff., 1503 f.

¹² The senses of 'woman' and 'wife' are not easily separated in γυνή.

¹³ Lebeck (n. 10) 86 ff. and also W. Stanford, *Ambiguity in Greek Literature* (Oxford 1939) 157 ff. note the extremely frequent occurrence of τελ- words in the *Oresteia*: Stanford writes 'the whole play is full of references to differently conceived τέλη, all of which are eventually reconciled in Aeschylus' final solution of the tragic situation' (157). He doesn't hint at how—or why—or even what this reconciliation could be. Cf. below p. 172.

¹⁴ See D. Clay, 'Aeschylus' *Trigeron Mythos*', *Hermes* xcvi (1969) 1 ff. for further examples of the third as last—or as false intimation of the last, as in *Ag.* 1283.

principle, that is, as a fixed point for the flow of events, and more precisely, as a stem for the passage of the reciprocal reversal of revenge, is introduced early in the *Oresteia* (*Ag.* 63–8):

πολλὰ παλαίσματα καὶ γυιοβαρῆ,
γόνατος κονίαισιν ἔρειδομένου
διακναιομένης τ' ἐν προτελείοις
κάμακος, θήσων Δαναοῖσιν
Τρώσι θ' ὁμοίως. ἔστι δ' ὅπη νῦν
ἔστι, τελεῖται δ' ἐς τὸ πεπρωμένον.

As Orestes seeks ὅπη τελεῖ, so the chorus tell the tale of the Trojan expedition to explain ὅπη νῦν ἔστι, τελεῖται δ' ἐς. . . . The workings of the 'corrupted sacrifice' of προτελείοις have been analysed by Zeitlin.¹⁵ She writes here: the 'coming death of Agamemnon is darkly riddled in τελεῖται δ' ἐς τὸ πεπρωμένον. *Teleitai*, that word of many meanings, primarily connotes fulfillment or end. However, in its punning word play with *proteleia* it assumes the color of its kindred definition, the performance of a holy rite' (465). But the full sentence, which she significantly does not quote, is ἔστι δ' ὅπη νῦν ἔστι τελεῖται δ' ἐς τὸ πεπρωμένον: 'It is where it now is. . . . Here the language is tautologous: it offers a summation of the present which merely asserts its existence, its description, in terms of itself. It is where it is. . . . This is juxtaposed to an expression of the future which joins the sense of 'end' to . . . its own 'fated moment', that is, which asserts the teleology of τελεῖται! 'It will end at its fated moment'. Where else?

A 'now' and an 'end' . . . but what is the relation between these juxtaposed phrases? What is the linkage between the νῦν and the τέλος—a linkage which constitutes the events of the play, the narrative? Does the elided δ' do more than mark the strange sense in which narrative itself is elided, veiled in this juxtaposition of a present and an end? For despite the suggested explanatory patterning of events, the passage of narrative between the 'now' and the 'end' is obscured, silent. And this silence, the gap that marks the transition, is expressive—in the manner that the watchman's explicit refusal to speak speaks. The narrative itself is reduced from any pattern (of cause and effect) to a tautologism equal to that of the language; and as the tautology of language may lead to an erasure or blocking of meaning, so this expression of narrative leads to an erasure or blocking of what might be called 'narrative sense'. Rather than simply suggesting a future narrative, the remark of the chorus seems to constitute a blocked expression of the how, why, and where of the passage and pattern of events. As so often in the *Oresteia*, the expression of apparent understanding is marked by doubts and repressions.

This analysis, which could certainly be extended, is offered to point towards the problematic relation between the present and the future, structured towards a telos; it is a relation that structures the narrative of the *Oresteia* importantly. Such a problematized relation may be read in the characters' many prayers and predictions which are seen as ways (hopes) of controlling the passage of narrative. Such a desire for explanatory control over the passage of events may be further read in the text's extensive expressions of and searches

¹⁵ Zeitlin (n. 3) *passim*.

for a pattern of cause and effect, particularly through the discourse of child-parent similarities.¹⁶ So a search for the determination such control would offer may be read in the predictive etymologies, realised, however, too late (cf. e.g. *Ag.* 681 ff.). So characters' hope for accurate prediction may be read in the many prophecies, and in *cledomancy*.¹⁷ So the feared and deprecated lack of control over events may be read in the fear of misplaced language, and the concomitant desire, demand, search, for accurate language, clarity, foreknowledge of what must happen—*προνοίαισι τοῦ πεπρωμένου . . . γλώσσαν . . . νέμων*, *Ag.* 683 ff. These general remarks concerning the relations between present and future, the search for a *telos*, which to develop beyond the suggestive would certainly entail a discussion of the *Oresteia* of far greater detail and length than is possible here, are intended to evoke something of a further context in which to read *τελεσφόρος* at *Cho.* 663. Clytemnestra is to come out *τελεσφόρος* because of the search in the narrative for a *telos* to the narrative. In this self-reflexive, self-dramatising search for an end, the narrative tells its own story. An end? ἢ μόρον εἶπω? For the series of ends are suggested to be gone beyond, and thus destabilized as end(s): indeed, the end that *τελεσφόρος* proclaims is seen rather as part of the network, the system of differences. For the *telos* Clytemnestra is to bring is in some senses no *telos*—her death does not end the passage of events, their significance, but sends Orestes to await a further *telos* (*Eum.* 243):

αὐτοῦ φυλάσσω ἀναμένω τέλος δίκης.

Here the unclear movement from present to future, the passage of narrative towards the *τέλος*, is marked by the main verb *ἀναμένω*. 'What awaits' was the source of Calchas' worry about the future (*Ag.* 154–5):

μῖμνει γὰρ φοβερὰ παλινόροτος
οἰκονόμος δολία νύμων Μῆνις τεκνόποιος.

What awaits, for the chorus, is the law of reciprocal reversal and hence ceaseless action (*Ag.* 1563–4):

μῖμνει δὲ μῖμνοντος ἐν θρόνῳ Διὸς
παθεῖν τὸν ἔρξαντα.

So for Cassandra the Erinyes, the drunken chorus, wait (*Ag.* 1189):

κῶμος ἐν δόμοις μένει.

And so one could extend the passage of differences and repetition—revenge, punishment and the agents of such action *waiting*.¹⁸

At *Eum.* 243, Orestes awaits the *τέλος δίκης*. We have discussed to some degree the shifting senses of *τέλος*. Many have commented on the shifting of the sense of *δίκη* in the *Oresteia*. This juxtaposition at this point in the narrative, the interpenetration of the two constellations of meaning, is marked. For this phrase implies far more than the outcome of Justice (not that the religious, initiatory, economic senses of *telos* are to

be forgotten with regard to Orestes). For what the Erinyes have been demanding is precisely *δίκη*, 'revenge', 'punishment'. *τέλος δίκης* (ironically enough from Orestes) can imply 'the end which consists in, comes from punishment', even 'death as revenge'. What Apollo has demanded, however, and what will happen, is a trial in a law-court. Orestes awaits, then, also the *telos* of a (the) law-court. This not only further implies Orestes' release, his initiation or reappropriation into society, that comes with Athene's final vote, but also looks forward to the way in which the *τέλος δίκης* is more than the end, outcome, of the law suit, since the Erinyes *go on* to turn against Athens in a further action of threatened revenge, a further resistance to *telos* as an end—or perhaps an indication that the specific *τέλος δίκης* which Orestes awaits as his liberation, is not sufficient as a *telos* for the narrative. These varying ways of reading the phrase constitute the tensions of the narrative of the *Eumenides*: is the *τέλος* to be death or an end to the actions of revenge, is the *δίκη* to be punishment, law-court, justice, Justice? οὐ γὰρ οἶδ' ὅπη τελεῖ—the ambiguity is (in) *τέλος* itself, and in its relation (juxtaposition) to the ambiguity of *δίκη*. Inscribed in the play of language, *τέλος* exceeds its own sense of *telos*.

As Orestes searches, then, for the *telos* of narrative, so he looks for the *telos* of the dream-text (*Cho.* 528):

καὶ ποῖ τελεῖται καὶ καρανοῦται λόγος;

The status of this search for the closure of *logos*, however, is placed at risk by the predictive nature of the *logos*, its relation to the confrontation of Orestes and Clytemnestra—where the words *αὐτῇ πρόσσχε μαστόν* (531) become realised in Clytemnestra's *τόνδε δ' αἰδεσαι . . . μαστόν* (896–7). The resultant *continuing* signification of, for example, Orestes' *ἐκδρακοντωθεὶς ἐγώ* (549), the production of meaning in the relation *between* the dream-text of confrontation and the re-presentation of confrontation resists in its play of *difference* the possibility of the *telos* as the fixed point for the narrative, for the *logos*. The process of interpretation followed by Orestes places the *telos* of the dream in the future, deferred: ἀλλ' εὔχομαι . . . τοῦνειρον εἶναι τοῦτ' ἐμοὶ τελεσφόρον. Yet it is precisely the production of meaning in such a structuring of difference and deferral that erases for the *logos* the possibility of the prayed for *τέλος*. In the *telling*, the *telos* becomes lost, stolen.

But the *Oresteia*, it is often asserted, offers a triumph of a reconciled ending—with which these difficulties with *τέλος* would seem to be in ironic tension. Can the reconciliation of the Erinyes reconcile all 'the differently conceived *τέλη* . . . in [the] final solution of the tragic situation', as Stanford asserts? Is the echoing play of meaning(s) to be delimited or controlled by this teleology of the trilogy? Rather than question this asserted teleology of the ending of the *Oresteia*, which many critics have discussed in sexual, political, social terms, it will have to be sufficient here to investigate briefly the language of closure in these final scenes. Are Athene's promises the *telos* to which *τελεσφόρος* finally points? *Eum.* 898–900:

Χο. καὶ μοι πρόπαντος ἐγγύην θήσῃ χρόνου;
Αθ. ἔξεστι γὰρ μοι μὴ λέγειν ἂ μὴ τελῶ.
Χο. θέλξειν μ' εὐκας καὶ μεθίσταμαι κότου.

¹⁶ For example, the *ainos* of the lion-cub ἐν βιότου προτελείως, *Ag.* 720. See B. Knox, 'The Lion in the House', *CPh* xlvii (1952) 17 ff.; Lebeck (n. 10) 119 ff.

¹⁷ See J. Peradotto, 'Clodomancy in the *Oresteia*', *AJP* xc (1969) 1 ff.

¹⁸ Cf. e.g. *Ag.* 1083, 1277; *Cho.* 567, 1050, 1062; *Eum.* 480, 894. . .

The Erinyes' questioning of the fixity of Athene's avowal prompts from the goddess 'a kind of dry humour' (Lloyd-Jones). 'It is possible for me not to say what I will not fulfill'. Not only does this strange double negative seem to refuse to make the positive statement the chorus require, but also *μη τελώ* seems to recall the series of deferred ends, failed achievements, corrupted sacrifices in this trilogy. Or, rather more precisely, the expression *μη λέγειν ἄ μη τελώ* points to the repeated and failed attempts 'to say an end', that is, to predict accurately what will be achieved, to pray successfully for fulfilment, to define absolutely an end in language—a series which is developed notably in the *Eumenides* by the failure of the Jury to offer a final word, a *telos* to the *logoi* of the trial or indeed the narrative. Even the word which marks the Erinyes' yielding, *θέλξειν*, although it echoes both Apollo's promise that Orestes will find in Athens *θεικτερίου μύθους* (81–2), and Athene's description of her *peitho* (886), nevertheless also suggests guile, deception, bewitchment in the dry humour. Kahn suggests even that *θέλγειν* 'fond son pouvoir sur la perversion même de la communication'.¹⁹ In this promise and acceptance, then, rather than simply uniting all the senses of *τέλη*, the exchange recalls precisely the disjunctions, the *glissement* of sense in the play, and particularly the difficulties associated with the exchange of language.

Indeed, the role Athene goes on to proclaim for the Erinyes is connected with the 'ends' of man, and her expression here is further marked with ambiguity (*Eum.* 952–5):

περί τ' ἀνθρώπων φανέρ' ὡς τελέως
διαπράσσουσιν τοῖς μὲν αἰοιδάς,
τοῖς δ' αὖ δακρύων
βίον ἀμβλωπὸν παρέχουσαι.

φανέρ' proclaims the clarity of the end which *τελέως* and *διαπράσσουσιν* seem so strongly to assert (though does not *τελέως* here, followed as it is by blessings for the ordering of the sexual life of the house, 956 ff., also echo the *τέλη* of the exchange of marriage and sacrifice?). This expression, however, follows on from Athene's powerful opening lyrics asserting a man's ignorance of the blows, the vicissitudes of life (*Eum.* 933–7):

οὐκ οἶδεν ὄθεν πληγαὶ βιότου.
τὰ γὰρ ἐκ προτέρων ἀμπλακῆματά νιν
πρὸς τὰσδ' ἀπάγει, σιγῶν <δ> ὄλεθρος
καὶ μέγα φωνοῦντ'
ἐχθραῖς ὄργαις ἀμαθύνει.

Rather than a simple move towards final clarity in man's fate, here we see a divine authorisation of obscured knowledge, the silent crushing of the loud-shouting man because of the unexplained sins of his ancestors. As with the earlier *πληγή* of Zeus that destroyed Troy (*Ag.* 367), the certainty of the terrible end of punishment seems opposed to the obscured pattern of responsibility or causality. Indeed, the certain end(s) that the goddess claims that the Erinyes are to bring for mortals (952 ff.) are rather doubled (*μὲν . . . δέ*). The Erinyes are to provide 'for some (*τοῖς μὲν . . .*) songs'. Here we may recall the changing songs

of woe and marriage (*Ag.* 709), the mourning songs, songs of hope and fear, the binding song etc. Like other expressions of language in the *Oresteia*, 'song' is ambiguous. . . . One part of the possibility *μὲν/δέ* is thus further doubled into doubt. 'For others' (*τοῖς δ' αὖ*) the Erinyes provide 'a dimmed life of tears'. This evocative phrase recalls the imagery of distorted sight (and mourning) throughout the play. The lack of clarity in (mortal) vision is a recurring image of the trilogy as it is in criticism. Here the miserable obscurity of the sublunary world is the alternative to the vagaries of song. The promised 'clear' ends that it will be the Erinyes' duty to bring are (ironically?) either merely the tear-dimmed vision of life or the ambiguities of communication. The new role of the Erinyes in the city does not seem to offer any simple ordering to the meaning of the *τέλη* it proclaims. Indeed, the *telos* of the play does not bring an end to the play of *telos*.

So how can we bring an end, fulfilment to our reading of *τελεσφόρος* at *Cho.* 663? It has offered more than a bounded and controlled ambiguity as Stanford suggests, more than a simply categorisable 'play on words'. As we will see, it is not sufficient, though salutary, to oppose with Lebeck the polysemy of an Aeschylean term to the reductive and stolid readings of the commentators and translators. Rather we have (tried to) read an 'uncontrollable echoing: a mad round of verbal associations, of signifier-signifying signifiers. The anxiety raised by language as language is that this echoing movement cannot be economised, that it is a fluid case.'²⁰ Indeed, we have attempted to show (trying to chart the trace of *τελεσφόρος*) something of the 'echoing movement'—how the boundaries we attempted to draw are transgressed by the constituting relations of difference (and deferral) between terms inscribed in a series each occurrence (repetition) of which is set in the extending and shifting series of the sentence(s), speech(es), scene(s) of which it is a constituent part; transgressed, exceeded, in the very act of drawing, defining, delimiting by the further signifying relations. Finally uncontrollable. We have seen further how the text dramatises and undercuts the very search for the *telos* it instigates (in the play of difference and repetition—that this section, my recapitulation, remarks). We have seen the 'anxiety' of language in the text, the fear of words (as predictions, descriptions, lies, blasphemies) not to mention the commentators' reductive readings. In the face of this play and dance of language, how then to read the text of *Cho.* 663–4? Lebeck opens her reading with a methodological statement that approaches the 'fluid case' of language: 'The philologist should not restrict himself to a single interpretation of such passages but should give free rein to all possibilities and associations. . . .'²¹ 'Free rein to all possibilities and associations' would seem to suggest an Utopian 'infinite thematics, open to endless nomination [which] can respect the enduring character of language, the production of reading'.²² But she pulls the reins in: ' . . . ultimately selecting as many as form part of a larger pattern and contribute to the meaning of the total work'.²³ But how can there be 'possibilities and

²⁰ G. Hartman, *Saving the Text: Literature/Derrida/Philosophy* (Baltimore 1981) 111.

²¹ Lebeck (n. 10) 3.

²² R. Barthes, *S/Z*, trans. R. Miller (London 1975) 92 f.

²³ Lebeck (n. 10) 3.

¹⁹ L. Kahn, *Hermès passe, ou les ambiguïtés de la communication* (Paris 1978) 145. Cf. also Kahn, 'Ulysse ou la ruse et la mort', *Critique* cccxciii (1980) 126 ff.

associations' (connotations, senses?) which do *not* 'contribute to the meaning of the total work'? What sort of meaning(s)? What (of the) excess? Like the 'customary methods of classical scholarship' that she derides, Lebeck's interpretative strategy 'ultimately' works in the repression of the differential structures in which meanings are constituted, to the fixed presence of 'the meaning'. Of the 'total play'. Beyond this (unquestioned) plenitude . . . can we interrogate further her 'selecting'? Is it a selection to form a pattern (as if a pattern were not already the selection)? Does it escape that teleology of interpretation? Orestes (for again the text dramatises the polemic) announces his dream-text interpretation in this way (*Cho.* 541–2):

. . . . τούτ' ἐμοὶ τελεσφόρον.
κρίνω δέ τοί νιν ὥστε συγκόλλως ἔχειν.

The final conjunction ὥστε marks precisely the teleology of his interpretative strategy; selecting, judging, defining *in order* that he might find coherence, a pattern—in order. The selection presupposes its organisation. The selection of significant possibilities and associations thus seems for Lebeck to be 'ultimate' in that having opened the text to the polyphonic voices of 'all the possibilities and associations', she can close off the reading to a pattern, repress the excess, define its boundaries. She can bring a *telos*. *τελεσφόρος γυνή!*

So she attempts (from 'the anxiety raised by language as language?') to economise, to master the language (*δεσπόσω λόγου*), which, however, playfully escapes, eludes, goes beyond (*πέφευγε τοῦπος*). 'Ultimately' she penetrates the text with selections and repressions. So 'selecting' marks the work of reading, the production of meaning by the reader, but it is a process that she leaves unquestioned, veiled in an appeal to the 'meaning of the total play', as if that were a criterion of interpretation, rather than constituted by it!

It is, however, the failure to consider the nature and presuppositions of that selection process, the rigidity/transgression of the boundaries drawn, the *telos* of her pattern, in short, the teleological closure of reading, which is particularly marked in an attempt to read the *Oresteia*, a play which not only dramatises a failing search for a defined τέλος—a series of shifting sites in the play of language ironically unresolved by any teleology of the trilogy—but which also dramatises the very act of interpretation as blocked, in error, a series of *méconnaissances*. *ἔρμηνέως ἔοικεν . . . τοροῦ δεῖσθαι*.

Reading *τελεσφόρος* cannot be simple, then. It opens a series of questions about the teleology of reading, about criticism's object (in all its senses) and method, about the boundaries and excesses of meaning—a (ceaseless) process of questioning²⁴ to question the (teleological) answer. Reading *τελεσφόρος* involves one in an inconclusive process.

2. Cassandra's all-too-good knowledge: τέλος and τελεῖν

Χο. τίνος πρὸς ἀνδρὸς τούτ' ἄχος πορσύνεται;
Κα. ἦ κάρτα <μακ>ρὰν παρεκόπης χρησμών ἐμών.
Χο. τοῦ γὰρ τελοῦντος οὐ ξυνηκα μηχανήν.

²⁴ M. Lynn-George, review of J. Griffin, *Homer on Life and Death*, *JHS* cii (1982) 245.

Κα. καὶ μὴν ἄγαν γ' Ἑλλήν' ἐπίσταμαι φάτιν.
Χο. καὶ γὰρ τὰ πυθόκραντα, δυσμαθῆ δ' ὄμως.

Ag. 1251–5

These lines have often been discussed by critics, but the ambiguity of τέλος and the play of the exchange of language between the prophetess and the uncomprehending chorus lead to a twist unrecognised by the editors and translators.

I want first briefly to recall the situation in which this dialogue takes place. Cassandra, the prophetess who has direct access to the truth of what will happen and the language to express it, ironically enough cannot communicate it to the chorus. In her own words, *ἔπειθον οὐδέν' οὐδέν, ὡς τὰδ' ἤμπλακον* (1212). That Cassandra has the language to express the complexity of events misunderstood by or concealed from the chorus, is expressed for the word *λαμπρός* (for example) by Silk²⁵ in the following manner: '*λαμπρός* (1180) has, remarkably enough, four senses; . . . For the first image, *λαμπρός* has the sense "clear" of the *χρησμός* . . . and "bright", like the bride's uncovered face . . . [Then] "keen" like the wind, *πνέων*, . . . "bright" like the sun . . . and as before "clear" like the subject *χρησμός* . . . [T]his intense concentration seems not merely apt for a prophetess versed in oracular equivocation, but somehow suggestive of her unique access to the complexities of events that are now reaching their fulfilment.' Indeed, the 'clarity' that the prophetess proclaims is veiled and layered in these interacting senses: her 'clarity' marks not 'simplicity' or 'literalness' but the complexity of an involved metaphoricity.

This quality of the prophetess' speech is seen markedly in one of the opening exchanges between the chorus and Cassandra, a dialogue which brings to the fore the role of the exchange of language as such in this scene (*Ag.* 1087–92):

Κα. ἄ, ποῖ ποτ' ἤγαγές με; πρὸς ποίαν στέγην;
Χο. πρὸς τὴν Ἀτρειδῶν· εἰ σὺ μὴ τόδ' ἐννοεῖς,
ἐγὼ λέγω σοι· καὶ τὰδ' οὐκ ἐρεῖς ψύθη.
Κα. ἄ ἄ
μισόθειον μὲν οὖν, πολλὰ συνίστορα
αὐτοφόνα κακὰ †καρταναι†
ἀνδροσφαγεῖον καὶ πέδον ραντήριον.

Cassandra's question as to what dwelling she is being led towards is answered by the chorus in a 'literal' and 'straightforward' manner: 'The house of the Atreids'. To which they add: 'If you do not realise this, I tell it to you; and you will not call it false.' The apparently pleonastic 'I tell it to you', and double negative of 'you will not call it false' are not merely otiose, however. For Cassandra in her answer accepts, corrects and specifies in a different manner that statement of the chorus—as the phrase *μὲν οὖν* marks. She wants a different sort of answer to her question, an answer in comparison with which the chorus' is markedly insufficient. She does not 'not call it false' so much as correct the distinction of the chorus between what they regard as true and false. And, as is the case with criticism also, saying-what-is-true and saying-what-is-false may be seen as a recurring concern of the *Oresteia* from Clytemnestra's reaction to the false news of Orestes' death to the institutionalisation of such a concern in the trial scene of the *Eumenides*. And importantly in this exchange (1087–92), as with Silk's

²⁵ M. S. Silk, *Interaction in Poetic Imagery* (Cambridge 1974) 197.

example of *λαμπρός*, Cassandra's truth is not a simple, performative, 'clear', 'literal' statement, but a complex interplay of associations and images—a 'mobile army of metaphors', to use Nietzsche's expression.

Let us return to *Ag.* 1252 ff. It would seem, as Fraenkel notes, that the specificity of the chorus' use of *ἀνδρός* prompts Cassandra's rejoinder: their lack of understanding is to be seen in the form of the question which expects an answer in terms of 'what man'. Their next remark is a further expression of their lack of understanding: explicitly, they do not understand the device of *τοῦ τελοῦντος*. The repetition of the masculine gender would seem to indicate a continuation of their still unrealised error. *μηχανήν* adds a further point: not only 'by whom' but 'how' the king is to die is uncertain.

This train of remarks worried Fraenkel: he writes: 'It is astonishing that Heimsoeth's emendation [*τοὺς γὰρ τελοῦντας*²⁶] can still be disregarded. In 1251 the coryphaeus asked who would do the deed. Would he now after Cassandra's taunt that he has completely failed to understand her, break off and say "because I cannot see the means whereby the doer should accomplish it" (Headlam)? Note first Fraenkel's determination of Cassandra's remark as a 'taunt'. Is that its tone? Is it not, for example, despairing? Not resigned? Not exasperated? Not disappointed? Why should Cassandra 'taunt' the chorus with ignorance, which seems to be an example of precisely what she herself described as *ἔπειθον οὐδέν' οὐδέν'*? And second, if it is such a 'taunt', is it not surprising that Fraenkel does not allow the possibility of the chorus changing tack *after* such a rebuff? Is not Cassandra's rebuff the *reason* for a change of line in their questioning? Is the point not that the chorus, told they do not understand, express another doubt, but a doubt which ironically repeats in the gender of the participle the mistake they hoped now to avoid? It would seem, then, that the manuscripts' *τοῦ τελοῦντος* needs to be changed only if the reader requires the chorus for some reason to make a particularly similar point twice.

τελοῦντος itself, moreover, as we will see, also adds a further point to the exchange. For why does Cassandra reply as she does? What is her *ἄγαν γε* knowledge of Greek, her knowing Greek 'all too well'? Is it not once again that the truth of her knowing is of a complexity of language beyond the chorus' less witting use? For it was Clytemnestra who had entered the palace with a fourfold ambiguous repetition of the term *τελ-* on her lips—an ambiguity between 'do', 'sacrifice' ('kill'), 'perform a rite', 'fulfil' (*Ag.* 972–4). It was to take part in that sacrifice that Clytemnestra had requested Cassandra to enter the palace at the beginning of this scene—a ghoulish invitation whose irony has not been lost on the commentators. For it is as victim Cassandra is asked to attend. And it is knowingly her death at the altar that Cassandra anticipates in this scene. Is not Cassandra's 'all too good' knowledge, then, also the knowledge of the unrecognised truth and appositeness of the ambiguity of

the chorus' use of *τελοῦντος*, which implies not only 'do', but also the specific doing of 'performing a rite', which is a 'sacrifice', 'death', 'end', 'fulfilment'? It is, indeed, a device of a *sacrificer* that the chorus do not understand, as they have not appreciated Clytemnestra's doubling use of the term throughout. Although the masculine gender shows their continuing ignorance, their choice of verb hints all too clearly at the truth to come. Cassandra understands Greek 'aye, all too well' because she understands the clonomantic implications of the chorus' choice of *τελοῦντος*.

Indeed, this double sense of *τελοῦντος* and the chorus' failure to understand pick up markedly an earlier exchange in this scene (*Ag.* 1107–13):

- Κα. ἰὼ τάλαινα, τόδε γὰρ τελεῖς;
τὸν ὁμοδέμιον πόσι
λουτροῖσι φαιδρῦνασα. πῶς φράσω τέλος;
τάχος γὰρ τόδ' ἔσται· προτείνει δὲ χεῖρ' ἐκ
χερὸς ὄρεγομένη.
Χο. οὐπὼ ξυνήκα· νῦν γὰρ ἐξ αἰνιγμάτων
ἐπαργέμοισι θεσφάτοις ἀμηχανῶ.

τελεῖς applied to Clytemnestra echoes the range of her ambiguous usage 'Will you do/sacrifice/fulfil/kill. . .?' The precision of this ambiguous use of *τελεῖς* is marked not only by its further echo in *τέλος*, but also by the express question as to the application of *τέλος*: *πῶς φράσω τέλος*; 'How am I to indicate *τέλος* ("the end", "sacrifice", "fulfilment" . . .)?' Or, as Fraenkel takes it, *τέλος* may imply a specification of *τελεῖς* in the way that the term is qualified by the answer that follows the question as to the application of *τέλος*, 'For it will come quickly'. That is, Clytemnestra is not just 'performing a ritual', or 'doing', but is actually 'finishing' or 'fulfilling' something which will have a sudden end. Fraenkel glosses: 'For what I now see her doing is not all: completion will come quickly.' Cassandra's lyrics, then, mark the range and fracturing of sense in *τελεῖς/τέλος*.

But any subtlety of expression is lost on the chorus, who remain at a loss, in the mire of bleary-eyed prophecies; indeed, the echo of this passage in 1253 prompted Weil to amend *οὐ ξυνήκα μηχανήν* to *οὐ ξυνήκα ἀμηχανῶν* to match the earlier expression of confusion. But the echoes of and differences from those earlier lines serve to distinguish further the ironic disjunction between the chorus' utterance and Cassandra's comment on it. Her excessive knowledge, then, does not only mark (ironically) the failure of the chorus to understand Cassandra, as the traditional reading understands it, but also Cassandra's realisation of the potentialities of the chorus' expression. The force of *ἄγαν γε* 'all too well', 'very well indeed', is not to be reduced either by deleting *γε* as Fraenkel says he is tempted to do,²⁷ or by undertranslating *ἄγαν γε* as, for example, Hermann does with his '*satis* tamen Graece locuta mihi videor'. *ἐπίσταμαι* refers not only to Cassandra's ability to speak Greek, but also to her ability to *understand what is said* 'all too well'.

The chorus reply to this 'Aye, so do Pythian ordinances: but they are hard to understand nonethe-

²⁶ Fraenkel prints this emendation in his text. Fraenkel also agrees with Wecklein that *τελοῦντος/τελοῦντας* is probably a future tense. The suggestion that there may be an ambiguity in the chorus' language as to whether the murder is at present being put into action or will in the future be put into action, may be thought to be significant with regard, say, to the chorus' later hesitations, when they are faced with further signs, *Ag.* 1346–71.

²⁷ Fraenkel compares 1241 where he follows Blass in deleting *γ'* from *ἄγαν γ' ἀληθόμαντιν*. 'All too true a prophet' would find an echo in the *ἄγαν γ'* knowledge. As I attempt to show in this article, there is considerable point to *ἄγαν γ'* in 1254. Does this bear on 1241 also?

less'. Their continuing confusion is marked not only in the doubt of their *δυομαθῆ δ' ὄμω*s, but also in the way in which they apparently relate Cassandra's knowledge of Greek specifically and only to her *speaking* Greek (and yet their inability to understand her). They do not seem to realise the full implication of her previous remark; once more, there is a failure of communication in this dialogue. But even their denial of knowledge may be seen as ironically and uncannily *cledomantic*. For the strange adjective *πυθόκραντα* 'Delphi-ordained' is, as well as *δυομαθῆ*, all too applicable to Cassandra's oracles, which stem precisely from her Apollo-ordained frenzy—and after that remark from the chorus, Cassandra indeed immediately turns again to a passage of prophetic fervour and an appeal (1257) to her mastering god. The hard-to-understand ordinances from Delphi are immediately evinced. This dialogue, then, a network of 'méconnaissances' and gaps in the exchange of language, once more brings to attention the role of communication as such in the *Oresteia*.

A final point: *καὶ μὴν* at the beginning of 1254 is not, then, to be regarded simply as 'adversative', but *also* as 'progressive'; *both* 'adversative' in that her understanding Greek is apparently no help to the chorus' understanding her, and 'progressive' in that her understanding Greek all too well leads to the ironic recognition of an unexpected truth in the chorus' language. Cassandra's metaphorical, sliding language of truth cannot be controlled by the imposition of such rigid distinctions and delimitations in the functioning of such an ambiguous connective—as for example Fraenkel here requires. In the slippage of the text, the attempt to control such ambiguity (an attempt which often calls itself 'objective', 'decisive', 'critical') is seen as arbitrary closure. Cassandra's language of truth, her access to the complexities of events and the language to express them, stands against the commentators' search for the univocal, literal, simple. The exchange between Cassandra and the chorus is not to be simply, 'objectively' controlled. For what the prophetess knows and expresses all too well is the excess in language.

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Rhea in Callimachus' *Hymn to Zeus*

ἐν δέ σε Παρρασίη 'Ρεῖη τέκεν, ἥκι μάλιστα 10
ἔσκεν ὄρος θάμνοισι περισκεπές· ἔνθεν ὁ χῶρος
ἱερός, οὐδέ τί μιν κεχηρημένον Εἰλειθυίης
ἔρπετον οὐδὲ γυνή ἐπιμίσγεται, ἀλλὰ ἐ 'Ρεῖης
ὠγγύγιον καλέουσι λεχώιον Ἀπιδανῆς.
ἔνθα σ' ἐπεὶ μήτηρ μεγάλων ἀπεθήκατο κόλπων 15
αὐτίκα δίζητο ῥόον ὕδατος, ᾧ κε τόκοιο
λύματα χυτλώσαιτο, τεὸν δ' ἐνὶ χρώτα λοέσσαι.
Λάδων ἀλλ' οὐπω μέγας ἔρρεεν οὐδ' Ἐρύμανθος . . .

Von Jan first drew attention to the etymological play in 14, an allusion to the derivation of Ἀπιδανῆς from ἀ-πίειν:¹ at the birth of Zeus Arcadia was yet

¹ F. von Jan (de Ian), *De Callimacho Homeri interprete* (diss. Strasburg 1893) 80 n. 1, *cl. Eustath. ad Dion. Perieg.* 414 (*Geog. Gr. min.*, ed. Müller ii 293).

waterless, as we learn from 18 ff. The play gains added point from 40 f., where the Peloponnesians thirst no longer: *παλαιότατον δέ μιν* (Neda) *ὑδωρ/υῖωνοι πίνουσι Λυκαονίης ἄρκτοιο*.²

This is not all. Most ancient etymologists derived 'Ρέα by metathesis from ἔρα, 'ground';³ but another tradition, at least as old as Plato, connected the word with *ρεῖν*. Thus Pl. *Crat.* 402b–c, *τί οὖν; δοκεῖ σοι ἀλλοιότερον Ἡράκλειτον νοεῖν ὁ τιθέμενος τοῖς τῶν ἄλλων θεῶν προγόνοις 'Ρεῖαν τε καὶ Κρόνον* [i.e. *Κροῖνον*]; ἄρα οἶε ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτομάτου ἀμφοτέροις *ρευμαίων ὀνόματα θέσθαι*; *Ei. Mag.* 701.24, *'Ρεῖα ἐπὶ τῆς θεοῦ Πλάτων μὲν, παρὰ τὸ ρεῖν καὶ μὴ μένειν τὸν χρόνον· οἱ δέ, ἐπειδὴ κόλποισιν ἀφράστοις/δεξαμένης Διὸς ὄμβροι καταρέουσι. Κρόνω δὲ λέγουσιν αὐτὴν συνεῖναι, καθόσον ἐξ αἰδίου χρόνου ἢ τοιαύτη ῥύσις γίνεται. Αἰγύπτιοι δὲ φασιν αὐτὴν εἶναι ῥύσιν καὶ φορὰν τῶν γινομένων πραγμάτων. Χρῦσιππος δὲ λέγει* (*fr.* 1084, *SVF* ii 318) *τὴν γῆν 'Ρεῖαν κεκλήσθαι, ἐπειδὴ ἀπ' αὐτῆς ρεῖ τὰ ὕδατα*. *Cf. Σ Hes. Th.* 135 p. 31 di Gregorio, *'Ρεῖα κατὰ τὸν Χρῦσιππον* (*fr.* 1085) *ἢ ἐξ ὄμβρων χύσις· ἔστι δὲ καὶ ἡ γῆ*; *Corn.* 3, 4, 6; *Σ A.R.* i 1098 p. 97 Wendel. In poetry the link is made explicit at *fr. Orph.* 132 Kern = *Or. Chald.* 56 des Places, *'Ρεῖη τοι νοερῶν μακάρων πηγῆ τε ῥοῆ τε· | πάντων γὰρ πρώτη δυνάμεις κόλποισιν ἀφράστοις/δεξαμένη γενεὴν ἐπὶ πᾶν προχέει τροχάουσαν*. Callimachus has this etymology in mind at 15 ff. When Rhea gave birth to Zeus and 'dropped him from her great lap', we are reminded of the *Κόλπος 'Ρέας*, the northern Adriatic;⁴ yet the goddess whose name suggests flowing water cannot find even a spring in which to wash her infant: *ῥόον ὕδατος* (16), *ἔρρεεν* (18) and *'Ρεῖη* (21) point the paradox.

The case for conscious etymologizing is strengthened by *Or. Sib.* iii 135 ff., where overt explication of *Δία* is followed immediately by juxtaposition of *'Ρεῖη* and *ῥεῖν*:⁵

ἀλλ' ὅτε τῇ τριτάτῃ γενεῇ τέκε πότνια 'Ρεῖη 135
τίχθ' Ἡρην πρώτην· καὶ ἐπεὶ ἴδον ὀφθαλμοῖσιν
θῆλυ γένος, ᾧχοντο πρὸς αὐτοὺς ἄγριοι ἄνδρες
Τιτήνης καὶ ἔπειτα 'Ρεῖη τέκεν ἄρσενα παῖδα,
τὸν ταχέως διέπεμψε λάθρῃ ἰδίῃ τε τρέφεσθαι
ἐς Φρυγίην, τρεῖς ἄνδρας ἐνόρκους Κρήτας ἐλοῦσα·
τοῦνεκα τὸν Δί' ἐπωνομάσανθ' ὅτι διεπέμφθη,
τὸ τρίτον αὖ Πλούτωνα 'Ρεῖη τέκε δία γυναικῶν,
Δωδώνην παριοῦσα, ὅθεν ῥεῖν ὑγρὰ κέλευθα
Εὐρώπου ποταμοῖο . . .

According to the more popular derivation, *'Ρεῖα* = *ἔρα* = *γαῖα* = *Γαῖα*: the two goddesses are often identified.⁶ In Call. *H.* 1 a flowing of water (*ἐκ δ' ἔχεεν*

² In itself the drinking = inhabiting expression is of course a *topos*: cf. E. Norden, *Sitz. d. kön. preuss. Akad. d. Wiss.* 1917, 673–4, *cl.* (in addition to the examples given by G. L. McLennan, *Callimachus. Hymn to Zeus* [Rome 1977] *ad loc.*) Crinag. *AP* ix 291.2 = *Garland of Philip* 1924 Gow–Page, *id.*, *AP* ix 430.1–2 = 1987–98 Gow–Page, *id.*, *AP* 61.5–6 = 1933–4 Gow–Page, *Nemes. Cyn.* 67–8.

³ For a full collection of evidence see O. Gruppe, *Griechische Mythologie und Religionsgeschichte* (Munich 1906) 1524 n. 2.

⁴ Thus McLennan: cf. A. *PV* 837 *κέλευθον ἦξας πρὸς μέγαν κόλπον 'Ρέας* (n.b. *μέγαν* ~ *μεγάλων κόλπων*, 15), *Σ ad loc.* *ὅτι 'Ρέας Κόλπος ὁ Ἰόνιος πρῶν ἔκαλεῖτο*.

⁵ I find no comment by V. Nikiprowetzky, *La troisième Sibylle, Études juives* ix (Paris/La Haye 1970).

⁶ See E. Cahen, *Les hymnes de Callimaque* (Paris 1930) 23.